

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

INTERNAL  
USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

ROUTE NUMBER	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	NOTE
1	10/20/86	10/20/86		
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DECLARATION  
CENTRAL INVESTIGATIVE  
SOURCE: GENEVA  
NAZI WAR CRIMES PROJECT  
DATE 2/87

FORM 10 OF PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

FROM

C / WPS

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designator, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED  
FORWARDED  
OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each communication. Show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column 4 with communications which are to be destroyed.)

1. C / R / D P / PC 5 0 4 0 3			
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DECLASSIFIED AND REMAINS THE PROPERTY OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXPERTS CLASSIFIED AS  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE DATE 2007

FORM NO. 10  
1 DEC 61

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GPO 1961 O-59364

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	SR/COP		
2			
3	DCSR	[ ]	9/1/62
4			
5	C/S12		
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	<i>Handwritten Signature</i>

## Remarks:

I would suggest,  
that my successor  
should look this  
over  
3/5 - Jack - Have you  
had a chance to talk to  
it as yet? - oz

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

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(40)

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	SR/COP	9/1/62	9/1/62
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

## Remarks:

Returned to you for file or other disposition. I agree with Quent that there can be no further increase of DOB capabilities over and beyond their current establishment unless we obtain additional personnel from outside sources for this specific purpose.



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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

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25 June 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** Exchange of views with [ ] and members of his staff regarding the establishment of UW assets in denied areas within the EUCOM area of responsibility

1. The attached memorandum (Att. 1) relates the first broad talk with [ ] and officers of his staff in regard to the long-unresolved matter of CIA's performance in the establishment of UW assets in the so-called denied areas within EUCOM's area of responsibility. It will be recalled that the memorandum also attached (Att. 2) was approved for such discussion by the DD/P and was coordinated with pertinent components of the Clandestine Services. It should be added that C/WPS emphasized that this was not a formal CIA paper, but rather an attempt to define the problem and work toward a solution and that, eventually, such a solution would be formalized with the JCS at the DCI level.

2. It was C/WPS's impression that [ ] ready acceptance of the hard facts and his desire to see something in being which, although not ideal, would be a firm capability, represents a healthy development. The officers of [ ] staff also appeared to welcome this candid and essentially positive approach by CIA.

3. It should also be noted that, as has been previously pointed out to the DD/P by C/WPS, JCS acceptance of major reliance on externally-held assets will call for an increase in DOB capabilities and will require considerable planning and organization both in this country and in Western Europe by CIA in order to achieve meaningful readiness.

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{  
4. War Plans Staff meanwhile awaits the informal comments  
of the Joint Staff on its proposal.

[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ]  
Chief, War Plans Staff

2 Attachments:

1. M/R, same subj, 25 Jun 62
2. DRAFT re UW Assets in  
Denied Areas

cc: DD/P (via C/OPSER)  
EE  
CA  
SR ✓  
WE  
FE

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25 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Exchange of views with [ ] and members of his staff regarding the establishment of UW assets in denied areas within the EUCOM area of responsibility

1. On Friday, 15 June 1962, Chief, War Plans Staff, [ ] and his Deputy met with [ ] Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), Joint Staff, to exchange views with regard to CIA's performance and proposals in connection with the establishment of UW assets in denied areas in response to the requirements of EUCOM military planners.

2. [ ] summarized the CIA efforts in the past to establish UW assets in denied areas which, although actively pursued, had resulted in providing only one UW asset of questionable value for support of USCINCEUR's UW requirements. [ ] then enumerated several factors which militate against the establishment of such assets in peacetime, and compared advantages of holding UW assets externally for introduction into denied areas when and as needed to support the military effort. He then stated that the CIA has prepared a paper (copy attached) which he hoped could serve as the basis for an understanding between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA on this subject.

3. [ ] agreed that it was impractical to attempt to establish UW assets in denied areas at this time and accepted the alternative of having these assets held externally. He then read the CIA paper and commented on it as follows:

a. NSC 5413/2 was written in 1958 and conditions have greatly changed since that time. For this reason, the special group has issued several National Security Action Memorandums which alter the responsibilities assigned in this document. He

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*act. 1*

went on to say that he is not interested in how well the CIA can train Montagnards, but he is interested in how much trouble it can make for Ho-Chi-Minh in North Vietnam.

b. He agreed with the proposals in the paper, and asked that we meet with members of his staff to go into the contents of the paper in more detail.

4. [ ] executive officer, escorted us to another conference room where we met with [ ] [ ] of the SACSA Staff. This meeting was fruitful in that it surfaced some of the reservations which the Joint Staff have regarding CIA's capabilities to develop UW assets, and with respect to the D-day capability of externally held assets. The major points brought out during this discussion were as follows:

a. The Joint Staff agrees that externally held assets have advantages over those held internally, but when such assets are held in the U.S. they cannot be considered as having a D-day capability. They prefer that such assets be held within the theater and in close proximity to the airlift which will be used to introduce them into the operational area.

b. That the UW requirements developed to date have in general been predicated upon a general war situation and are, therefore, not specifically responsive to requirements which might emerge in contingency situations. It was recognized that each contingency situation could have different requirements, and that the very nature of contingencies makes it impractical to foresee exactly what will be required. For this reason the flexibility with which externally held assets could be employed, and the fact that they could be used to exploit situations of opportunity, make such assets more responsive to changing conditions than those which have been developed internally. Further, the probability of D-day occurring without warning in a contingency situation is not considered a likely possibility; whereas, in a general war a nuclear attack could occur with little or no warning. Since contingencies usually develop over a period of time, assets held in the U.S. could be moved to overseas locations during periods of tension and prior to a decision to employ them.

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c. [ ] stated that he thought plans would be greatly improved if capabilities actually existed to implement them. As it is now, military plans predicated on CIA assets within denied areas have no validity since such assets are non-existent. He welcomed the development of plans based on capabilities.

d. [ ] raised a question regarding the definition of denied areas. It was his opinion that there are several categories of denied areas and that perhaps some distinction should be made between them. He pointed out that there were certainly differences between the USSR and some of the Satellites and between Communist China and North Korea or North Vietnam, but they are all classified as denied areas. It is his opinion that in some of the so-called denied areas it should be much easier to establish covert UW assets than it would be in the USSR. No firm conclusions were reached with regard to this question.

5. The Joint Staff requested that we leave a copy of the paper with them to study, and suggested a subsequent meeting to formalize a position paper which the CIA would forward to the JCS for consideration.

6. [ ] stated that the War Plans Staff would welcome the opportunity to discuss the paper further and requested that SACSA inform him when they were ready for the next meeting.

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Proposal for Exchange of Views with Elements of the  
DOD and JCIN on Means to UW Assets in Denied Areas  
WHAT AND WHO IS THE POINT OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. DDCI 5412/3 gives the CIA responsibility for covert operations and lists the types of actions to be accomplished. In part this Directive states, "in areas where with maximum protection and to the extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by International Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of those forces in the event of war, including whatever practicable provision of a base upon which the military may expand those forces in time of war for staybehind assets and evasion and evasion and infiltration." In military terminology, UW consists of Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion and Escape, and Subversion.
2. With the advent of the Special Forces (SF) program in the Army, and the development of an Evasion and Escape (E&E) program by the Air Force, military requirements for CIA covert action support increased. The Army and the Air Force have indicated that their respective programs would be greatly facilitated if the CIA could provide assets within denied

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ATT. 2

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... which would support the conduct of small scale guerrilla operations.

... the CIVB should be capable of military operations.

... the development of a military CIVB force should be for the purpose of

... a small group of commandos which is more or less independently

... the CIVB force.

... the CIVB force should be able to conduct small scale guerrilla operations.

... the CIVB force should be able to conduct small scale guerrilla operations.

... the CIVB force should be able to conduct small scale guerrilla operations.

... the CIVB force, L.S., Guerrilla Warfare, Training and Tactics

... the CIVB force.

... the CIVB force should be able to conduct small scale guerrilla operations.

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- d. Where pre-war establishment of assets resident in the denied areas is not possible, to recruit and train and hold externally selected crews of agent and action personnel for wartime infiltration into the operational area.

The JCS, after further consideration of these four kinds of assets, stated their preference for a, b and c assets in that order. With regard to external assets, the JCS consider that for those to be considered effective for Priority I operations (UW), they should be held within the theater where they would be readily available.

4. In 1959 the number of UW requirements submitted to the CIA by USCENTCOM totaled 194, of which 80 were for assets in denied areas. Of the denied area requirements CIA accepted 64, three against assets in living and 61 against programmed assets. In 1960 total requirements dropped to 116, of which 65 were in denied areas. Of the latter CIA accepted 53 against living assets and 12 against programmed assets. Of the 53 accepted 18 were against assets which were not held assets. Only one recently developed accepted against no asset in place in a denied area. Acceptances based on programmed assets vary of little value for current operational planning unless their programmed readiness date falls within the effective date of the Military Plan (1 July - 30 June). CIA experience in the past has been that in more than 50% of the cases the programmed readiness date was not met. As a result, changes have been made in asset development

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program and requirement evaluation procedures which will make it possible to forecast readiness dates with greater certainty.

b. b. The types of assets which we have informed the military could be developed fall into two broad categories:

- (1) Those developed and held within the area of projected operations, and
- (2) Those held externally.

Assets to be developed within the area of operations are considered to be the most desirable types, but the many problems in developing such assets in denied areas are of an order and scope that render their development infeasible. Among the problems are: maintaining security within the area, maintaining the motivation of the agents, periodic training, the risk of having the asset come under enemy control, and the time, effort and cost which would go into such an agent, when there is little likelihood of success and when there are other priority tasks for current operations.

b. The security risks involved in maintaining individuals and training are such that this can only be done in very limited areas and cannot be counted on as a standard procedure. CIA has not yet found a way to maintain the motivation of individuals in denied areas without frequent contact between the case officer and the asset.

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TRUTH: If we are allowed to practice our religion openly, if we  
are not allowed to practice our religion, he goes your way  
and, on the other hand, if we are allowed to "practice" he picks other  
ways. That's the main point which Doctor said and that which we  
have to prove in our defense. So, let me repeat that we must prove that  
other country controls. The ability of such control would be denied  
in our country. We don't want to practice our religion or any other religion  
in our country. I am not going to say that we are not allowed to do so.

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Mr. It is my understanding that you will do your best to see that there will be no unnecessary expense.

**Information and comments** We welcome your comments and suggestions on this document.

After the first two days of the experiment, the subjects were asked to rate their level of motivation on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = low motivation and 10 = high motivation. The results showed that the subjects' motivation levels were significantly higher on the second day compared to the first day (Mann-Whitney U-test,  $p < 0.05$ ). This suggests that the subjects were more motivated to perform the task on the second day, which may have contributed to their improved performance.

It has been CIA's experience, however, that the life span of current events is uncertain and it is not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy which

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will still be available on the framework of present day

a. The development of cultural agents to be used in the  
operational area of operations, either within the U.S. or overseas,  
will be examined and implemented as required. Note: the number  
of personnel of UV teams will be limited on each mission.

Although it is a costly procedure in terms of  
personnel and money, this would be preferable

and less cumbersome over time than personnel sent  
internally. These are: They are less subject  
to communication; they can be trained for the specific

task they are to perform; they can, with proper  
attention to security factors, undertake joint  
training with military units if such is indicated;

and they will be available at the time needed.

With regard to the development of culturally

able persons, CIA ~~personnel~~ personnel would be  
recruited on small basis of two or three men who  
would be infiltrated into the operational area prior  
to the Special Forces Team. These agents would  
be complementary to the Special Forces and would  
be able to serve as guides and interpreters since  
they would have fluency in the language and a

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dissemination of this memo. CIA will immediately begin  
assessing its resource pool of contractors and available  
commercial and government facilities in the desired areas, and  
will then determine which has a minimal recovery of such  
information in the U.S. CIA will be consulting  
the DIA with respect to this matter. If such information  
and recovery limitations, CIA would propose to use  
other than CIA commercial resources. CIA is currently  
conducting the pool of current contractors and reviewing  
and improving the system of selecting sources.

In addition, CIA has better worked out the mobile  
CIA units and they expect to transport U.S. held  
information quickly to the various staging areas.

4. CIA will commence to review all current intelligence sources  
available back through 1974 potential. The Board will  
then be responsible for determining which proliferation of new information

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